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ABSTRACT 
Wearable devices are an important part of internet of things 
(IoT)with many applications in healthcare. Prevalent security 
concerns create a compelling case for a renewed approach by 
incorporating the ICMetric technology in IoT healthcare. The 
ICMetric technology is a novel security approach and uses the 
features of a device to form the basis of cryptographic services 
like key generation, authentication and admission control. 
Cryptographic systems designed using ICMetric technology use 
unique measurable device features to form a root of trust. This 
paper uses the MEMS bias in a body wearable Shimmer sensor to 
create a device ICMetric. The ICMetric identity is used to 
generate cryptographic key to perform encryption and decryption 
of patients data which is being communicated to health 
professionals. The cloud based component of the proposed 
framework provides much needed distributed data processing and 
availability. The proposed schemes have been simulated and 
tested for conformance to high levels of security and performance. 
Keywords 
Cryptography; security; ICMetric; Internet of Things; cloud 
computing; secure healthcare systems; 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Advances in the field of ubiquitous and pervasive computing has 
resulted in the creation of a new computing paradigm called the 
Internet of Things. The Internet of Things is a collection of 
devices and systems which are designed as ubiquitous elements 
thus enabling the creation of smart environments. Devices for the 
Internet of Things have varying capabilities and purpose. Some 
devices are intended to be worn on the body while others will be 
mounted on a wall. This implies that more than often these 
devices will be sharing highly critical information. For example 
an IoT wearable health device will monitor the physiological 
signals and then forward the data to a heath provider. In such 
scenarios the importance of security cannot be denied. 
Internet of Things based devices are available in various forms 
and sizes for instance televisions, refrigerators, watches, 
camerasetc. As devices integrate into daily life it must be 
recognized that attacks can lead to violation of physical security 
and privacy. As the Internet of Things grows, companies are 
trying to design innovative systems that revolutionize how we 
interact with technology. While innovations are noteworthy it has 
also been seen that some devices do not possess the security 
services they should have. In this paper a security framework has 
been proposed that studies the security of wearable devices in the 
Internet of Things. The proposed security framework is based on 
the novel Integrated Circuit Metric (ICMetric) technology and has 
been extended to the domain of Cloud Computing by outsourcing 
the data monitoring and analysis components to the cloud 
environment while still conforming to the privacy and 
confidentiality requirements of the user domain. Conventional 
security algorithms have design weaknesses which have led to 
systems being exposed. Conventional cryptography uses 
algorithmic intractability as a root of trust. This is not always the 
best basis for cryptographic algorithms, which is why researchers 
are considering other methods upon which security can be based. 
The ICMetric technology uses features of a device to form the 
basis of cryptographic services. The ICMetric technology uses 
unique measurable features of a device which cannot be created 
by an adversary. This results in a unique identity called the 
ICMetric of a device and is used as a root of trust in cryptographic 
services. What sets the ICMetric technology apart from other 
fingerprinting technologies is the fact that the ICMetric of a 
device is never stored on a system and never communicated.The 
ICMetric technology is used to generate cryptographic keys 
thereby enabling device verification while providing a strong link 
between the device and cryptographic key. To address the issues 
related to secure remote monitoring of patients using healthcare 
IoT devices, we propose the development of a secure cloud 
framework for patient monitoring which is based on the ICMetric 
technology. The features translate directly into providing high 
levels of security at the cost of very limited resource. 
The biggest advantage of the designed scheme is that at no point 
during the lifecycle of its secure functioning, does it require any 
human intervention. This is particularly important from the 
patient’s perspective since taking patient input is not a plausible 
concept while securely transmitting health data. Therefore all the 
security functions of our framework are based on ICMetric data 
derived from the respective devices. 
The research makes the following contributions to the secure 
cloud framework for health IoT devices based on the ICMetric 
technology: 
The first contribution of this paper is a study on features which 
can be used for the creation of a device ICMetric. The paper 
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shows that MEMS sensors possess a unique bias which can be 
used for ICMetric generation. The study is based on a testbed of 
six identical Shimmer sensors. The accelerometer, gyroscope and 
strain gauge sensors have been used for taking readings and then 
studied statistically.The proposed scheme intends to bind a 
cryptographic key with the sensor’s ICMetric information. 
The second contribution of the paper is a secure admission control 
and mutual authentication process as a core component. This part 
of the design is aimed at recognizing each IoT device which is 
part of the application. It recognizes each patient based on 
allocated sensors, and the health professional based on his end 
device. So this component authenticates, authorizes and evaluates 
each entity prior to secure communication of the health data. 
A challenge with the generated device ICMetric is the entropy and 
length of the generated secret value. Hence the third contribution 
of the paper is a strong symmetric session key that is based on the 
communicating parties device ICMetric. The generated symmetric 
key facilitates secure communications between the patient and the 
health professional. 
The fourth contribution of the paper is a demonstration of 
encryption/ decryption and integrity of a criticality trigger from 
the patient to the health professional. The trigger is an indication 
to the health professional that a patient is experiencing an episode 
of some medical emergency and that an appropriate action is 
required. The trigger is encrypted/ decrypted based on the 
generated symmetric session key between the patient and the 
health professional.The generated session key also serves to carry 
out mutual authentication between the patient and the medical 
specialist. 
The fifth contributionin the framework is the use ofcloud 
environment for scalability and distributed data processing 
services. The cloud has been used to enhance the practicality of 
the framework by providing the functionalities of availability and 
data analysis of patient data. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows; section 2 
discusses recent advancements in the field of IoT. Section 3 
highlights some threats in wearable IoT systems. Section 4 
discusses in detail the ICMetric technology and its design 
principles. A detailed attack model is also presented in this 
section. Section 5 presents the concept of a sensor bias in MEMs 
sensors. Section 6 details the basic system design and the design 
goals of the proposed framework. Section 7 presents a detailed 
study on how the ICMetric can be generated using MEMS sensor 
bias. In section 8, details of the proposed scheme are presented 
with focus on admission control and symmetric key generation. 
Section 9 presents a study on the cloud component of the 
proposed scheme from various perspectives like security, 
scalability and stability. The proposed schemes have been 
simulated and analyzed in section 10 and 11. The paper concludes 
in section 12 with a summary of findings and directions for future 
work. 
2. INTERNET OF THINGS 
The internet of Things (IoT) is a network of smart devices that 
collect and communicate data through various forms of network 
connectivity. Hence the IoT is a collection of devices that sense 
various parameters and then communicate these on the internet. A 
user may have many IoT capable devices that connect to each 
other and share information. The emergence of IoT is due to 
advancements in the field of embedded systems, pervasive and 
ubiquitous computing. IoT devices interact directly with the 
physical world which means that the data can be large which is 
why the data is often processed via the cloud. Once the data is 
available on the cloud it is processed by applications that are 
designed with machine learning and data analytical algorithms. 
IoT devices come in many forms with varying applications and 
capabilities. For instance devices can be designed for health 
monitoring, fitness monitoring, home automation, industrial 
support, entertainment and gaming. 
2.1 Wearable Technology 
The IoT is composed of many different forms of devices. Some 
devices are mounted on a wall, some are designed to be carried 
while others are meant to be worn on the body. Wearable 
computing has been conceived to promote ubiquitous and 
pervasive computing. What sets wearable technology apart from 
conventional smart devices is the fact that wearable device are 
intended to be worn on the body and not carried. Given below are 
some application domains related to wearable devices. 
Health monitoring – Devices that monitor the physiological 
signals of the wearer. These devices are worn on the body and can 
measure a range of body signals like EMG, EMI, ECG etc. Health 
monitoring devices are often embedded with MEMS sensors to 
provide features like fall detection in the elderly. 
Fitness monitoring – Devices designed to be worn during physical 
exercise. Fitness monitoring devices are pedometer based devices 
equipped with MEMS sensors to compute distance covered, steps 
taken and calories burnt. Fitness monitoring devices also measure 
heart rate as an indicator of exercise. 
Wearable devices are not just limited to health monitoring and 
fitness monitoring. Some wearable devices are worn during 
gameplay like head wearable displays that create an immersive 
environment. Similarly some devices assist users like wearable 
displays and devices that help with warehouse management, item 
tracking, location determination etc. 
3. THREATS IN WEARABLE IoT 
DEVICES 
Research[1] shows that IoT devices have three limitations that are 
a barrier to their wide adoption. The limitations are battery life, 
chipset limitation and design concerns. These limitations have an 
impact on how devices are designed and what services they offer. 
Owing to these limitations many essential services like 
cryptography are often ignored. 
Healthcare wearable devices are a major innovation[2] in the field 
of IoT. Research[3] shows that IoT devices will revolutionize how 
healthcare services are provided. Wearable devices allow patients 
to be constantly monitored thus promoting point of care services. 
In the research authors have identified four challenges faced by 
wearable devices i.e. confidentiality, authentication, network 
security and a hostile environment. 
A recent research [4]shows that authentication can be carried out 
by using bioelectrical impedance signals. The authors show that it 
is possible to use a Shimmer health sensor to authenticate a device 
wearer with 98% accuracy. The proposed system does not offer 
any other cryptographic service like confidentiality. 
Authentication alone is an incomplete cryptographic system and 
gives a false guarantee of security. 
A recent research[5] shows that even widely marketed devices 
possess weaknesses. The authors study the fitness watch Fitbit and 
show that it possesses weaknesses. After reverse engineering the 
tracker the authors show that the device transmits user credentials 
in plain text. It has also been demonstrated that any HTTP data 
processing takes place is in plain text. The Fitbit also possesses a 
weakness in which a physical exercise can be forged by simply 
attaching the device to the wheel of a moving vehicle. 
Any system that possess cryptographic implementations are not 
immune from attacks. Research[6][7][8] shows that cryptographic 
keys can be attacked through various methods like brute force, 
cold boot attack, malware etc. Each form of attack exploits a 
certain element of the system which is why no single solution can 
guarantee a fool proof system. Attacks on cryptosystems and 
various forms of IoT devices creates a compelling case for a 
renewed security approach. 
4. INTEGRATED CIRCUIT METRIC 
Cryptographic algorithms rely on a widely published algorithm 
which means that the security is based on a secret key. To ensure 
that the system remains secure the cryptographic keys are kept 
secret. If stored cryptographic keys are captured then the entire 
system can be exposed. Owing to this reason cryptographers are 
constantly increasing key sizes. An increase in the key size only 
ensures that the keys are safe from brute force attack but does not 
entirely eliminate the possibility of cryptographic key theft. 
Research shows that cryptographic keys can be attacked in many 
ways and efforts to increase the key size are often inadequate. 
Cryptographic systems may also use algorithmic intractability to 
offer security. Algorithmic intractability cannot guarantee security 
which is why research is attempting to base a cryptographic 
implementation on novel roots of trust like Physically Unclonable 
Functions[9][10] and Integrated Circuit Metric. 
The Integrated Circuit Metric (ICMetric) technology[11][12] is a 
novel approach for deterring key theft in cryptographic systems. 
The technology has two purposes first as a key theft deterrent and 
secondly as a basis for cryptographic services. The ICMetric 
technology proposes entirely eliminating stored keys from a 
system. To generate a key, unique measurable device features are 
obtained to create a device identity called an ICMetric. The 
security of the ICMetric technology lies in finding unique device 
hardware and software features which cannot be easily predicted 
by an adversary. The individual device features are extracted and 
processed to produce an identification for the device. The 
identification is called a device ICMetric and is used as a basis for 
key generation. Once the key is generated it is used for the 
provision of cryptographic services and then entirely discarded. 
Hence the keys are generated when required and discarded 
thereafter. 
Previous researches [13][14][15] on ICMetric generation show 
that the ICMetric can be generated using the Program Counter 
(PC) and Cycles Per Instructions (CPI). The experiments have 
shown that unique features can be extracted using the PC and CPI 
but the concept has not been applied to smart devices and the 
IoT.ICMetric generation is composed of two steps i.e. the 
calibration phase and the operation phase. These phases are 
applied only when required after which the cryptographic keys 
and any associated data is discarded. Data related to the ICMetric 
or device features is never communicated even to trusted features. 
The two steps of ICMetric generation are as follows: 
4.1 Calibration Phase 
In the calibration phase suitable features are selected and readings 
are obtained by providing the required stimulus. The readings are 
used to establish frequency distributions and histograms for each 
feature. The frequency distributions are subjected to statistical 
analysis. This produces statistical credentials suitable for ICMetric 
generation. 
4.2 Operation Phase 
In the operation phase feature sets are established using statistical 
credentials. The individual feature values are combined to 
generate a unique ICMetric. The ICMetric is processed in a key 
generation algorithm to generate a cryptographic key. 
4.2.1 Combining Features 
The final ICMetric is computed by combining individual 
statistical credentials by either using the feature addition 
technique or the feature concatenation technique. 
By using the feature addition technique, individual feature values 
are added to create a device ICMetric. The resulting ICMetric is 
highly diverse but lacks length.If 𝐹 is a device feature then the 
device ICMetricunder the feature addition technique can be 
represented as: 
𝑖𝑐𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐 =  𝐹𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
If a longer ICMetric is required then the feature concatenation 
technique is suitable. Here the individual feature values are 
concatenated to produce a longer yet less diverse ICMetric. If || is 
the concatenation operator then the device ICMetric under the 
concatenation technique can be represented as: 
𝑖𝑐𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐 =  𝐹1| 𝐹2 |⋯ ||𝐹𝑛   
5. MEMS BASED SENSOR FEATURES 
The ICMetric of a device is based on unique device features. 
Hence the security of ICMetric lies on identifying features that are 
extractable by the legitimate owner of a device but not by an 
adversary. Device features can be explicit and implicit. The 
problem with using explicit features is that often they can be 
easily extracted by the adversary. For example the MAC address 
is a unique feature of a device but can be captured without much 
effort. An adversary can obtain the MAC address from the 
exterior of a device or even by using a network surveillance tool. 
This research demonstrates the ICMetric can be generated using 
the bias in a MEMS sensor. 
Research shows that no two sensors are created alike[16]. Sensors 
made by a single manufacturer having the same design, material 
and manufacturing process will differ from each other 
considerably. These variations are beyond the control of the 
manufacturer and can be noticed in the readings obtained from the 
sensor. A common variation in MEMS sensors is an operational 
bias. This bias is introduced when a sensor is mounted onto the 
main board. When a sensor is being soldered onto the main board 
heat and pressure causes a slight deformation of the sensor. This 
deformation causes a bias in the sensor readings. There are other 
reasons[17] for the bias like operational temperature, wear of the 
sensor components and inconspicuous damage.Modern consumer 
wearable devices are embedded with MEMS sensors which enable 
them to offer a wide range of services. For instance many 
wearable devices are being embedded with an accelerometer, 
gyroscope, strain gauge sensors. These sensors enable the 
detection of inertial motions of the wearer of the device. Even 
though these sensors are designed as precision components; they 
do not possess the required perfection. This research shows that it 
is possible to use the MEMS bias to generate a device ICMetric. 
6. FRAMEWORK ASSUMPTIONS 
The proposed health sensing cloud application, details a system 
for ICMetric based IoT devices to guarantee a system that can 
assist in secure communication of patient data between the patient 
and doctor, while deterring all forms of key capture. 
6.1 System Model 
The proposed scheme is designed for all entities/devices which 
form part of the IoT healthcare network and have trust in the 
healthcare provider’s server. The healthcare provider’s server is 
responsible for controlling individual IoT devices in the network. 
The server enables IoT devices that have never had contact before 
to interact securely and confidentially. The following assumptions 
are made for the proposed scheme: 
 The communication links between the server of the healthcare 
provider and IoT devices are all unprotected. Therefore, the 
data being transmitted over the communication channel should 
be protected. 
 Each entity (sensor, device, etc.) that is part of the health 
monitoring application needs to be registered with the 
healthcare provider’s server. 
 The server is operated by the healthcare provider and is 
responsible for assigning all the network specific 
configurations to successfully join a network.Figure1 shows 
the high level system architecture of the proposed solution; 
connecting the patient and the health professional with the 
health care provider’s server, and outsourcing the data storage 
and analysis functionality to the cloud service provider.
 
Figure 1. System architecture for the proposed secure IoT health care system 
 
6.2 Adversary Model 
Health care IoT comprise of dedicated devices that aim to sense 
and monitor data. The security of healthcare IoT devices has 
become particularly important, since the risk of health data theft 
has been recognized. Prevalence of attacks on healthcare systems; 
stakeholders like device manufacturers, administration agencies, 
health professionals and researchers have started paying extra 
emphasis on the implementation of security in healthcare IoT 
applications. A major threat facing healthcare IoT is the 
possibility of data leakage while it is being transmitted over the 
channel. Eavesdropping is a major threat to patient privacy, the 
adversary can easily read unencrypted messages being transmitted 
over the network. The captured messages can reveal important 
information to the attacker about the patient, which can pose a 
serious threat to patient privacy. Patient’s data can be safeguarded 
from these attacks by employing proper security measures in the 
system that provide privacy to the sensed patient data. 
6.3 Security Goals 
Security and privacy issues have been described as the most 
challenging problems in health monitoring systems in IoT. The 
security of patient’s health records has always been a major 
concern since the adoption of computers in the healthcare domain. 
There are several security and privacy challenges that healthcare 
IoT applications generally try to address, so as to secure the 
healthcare data in an application. The proposed secure health 
sensing system based on ICMetric, aims to fulfil the following 
security and privacy challenges: 
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Session Key Generation. A fundamental goal of the scheme is to 
generate strong ICMetric session keys. This goal ensures 
generation and use of keys with high entropy and adequate size, 
so that pre-computed attacks are not possible and keys are not 
brute-forced easily. 
Confidentiality. A vital security goal of the scheme is to maintain 
confidentiality of healthcare data transmitted by the IoT 
devices.Preserving the secrecy of patient’s health data is of utmost 
importance, so that the data is not leaked to adversaries. 
Mutual Authentication. An essential security goal of the 
proposed scheme is to authenticate healthcare devices in the IoT. 
Authentication ensures that only authenticated devices are 
recognized at the server and any impersonating entities are 
eliminated at source. This goal ensures that only authenticated 
health professional, server and registered IoT devices can get 
access to the patient data. 
Integrity. A central goal of the proposed framework is to 
maintain integrity of data transmitted by the healthcare devices in 
the IoT. Integrity ensures that the manipulation of healthcare data 
by adversaries is detected at the recipient. 
Availability. An important goal of the proposed framework is to 
ensure that the relevant data and information is available to the 
authorized health professional at all the times. Owing to this the 
framework has to be resistant to denial of service attacks from 
adversaries. 
Analysis. Another key goal of the proposed framework is that the 
data collected from the different data sources can be aggregated 
and processed for the purpose of current and future medical 
research and analysis. This increases the usability and 
practicalityof the framework beyond its basic scope. 
7. MEMS BIAS ESTABLISHMENT 
Study on MEMS sensors shows that the bias in a sensor can be 
used to create a device ICMetric. Experiments show that each 
sensor possesses a unique bias which can be recreated if the 
sensor is subjected to the same stimulus. To create the device 
ICMetric from a MEMS sensor a sensor testbed is assembled 
which is composed of six identical Shimmer sensors. The stimulus 
is created by leaving the sensor on a flat surface which is free 
from vibrations and movement. When subjecting the sensors to 
this stimulus then under ideal conditions the target sensors should 
sense no acceleration, rotation or strain.Experiments show that 
this is not the case and that the readings vary considerably. Owing 
to limitation of space a graph is provided for one axis of 
accelerometer, gyroscope and strain gauge. A total of 1500 sensor 
readings have been obtained to test the presence of a unique 
sensor bias. Unimodal distributions have been obtained for the six 
Shimmer sensors that form the testbed. Figure 2 shows graphs 
from a Shimmer accelerometer, gyroscope and strain gauge. The 
above graphs confirm that the response to a stimulus can vary 
from sensor to sensor. The unimodal distributions show that every 
sensor has an operational range within which the sensor responds. 
This operational range is unique to a sensor and cannot be 
predicted by an adversary. The MEMS bias is easy to recreate by 
the user of a device as there is no need for special instrumentation 
or actions required by the user. Also a user does not need to 
provide any form of input for establishing the sensor bias. 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
Figure 2. Unimodal distributions from a Shimmer sensor 
embedded with accelerometer, gyroscope and strain gauge. 
Given in the table 1 are the statistical indicators for the above 
graphs. The statistical indicators confirm that each sensor has a 
different bias which differs from device to device and from axis to 
axis. Each statistical indicator confirms that the population 
behavior is unique for each sensor. Even if two statistical 
indicators are similar then other statistical indicators will differ to 
show the varying operations of each sensor. The analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) p-value confirms that there is significant 
difference between the sensor readings. 
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Table 1. Statistical indicators for the unimodal distributions 
from a Shimmer accelerometer, gyroscope and strain gauge 
 Accelerometer Gyroscope Strain 
gauge 
Mean 
-0.43432 -127.81196 0.41427 
Standard 
deviation 
0.07083 16.48308 0.09056 
Skewness 
0.01077 0.02725 -0.07965 
Confidence 
interval 
-0.43791 
to 
-0.43074 
-128.6463 
to 
-126.9775 
0.40969 
to 
0.41886 
Kurtosis 
0.01234 -0.44354 -0.8269 
p-value 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
8. ICMETRIC BASED SECURE 
TRANSMISSION PROTOCOL 
The proposed security framework details an ICMetric centered 
cloud based health monitoring scheme. The proposed scheme is 
intended to improve the security of health monitoring applications 
by providing secure key generation, mutual authentication, 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of the health data in 
combination with the ICMetric technology. 
The secure data transmission protocol is responsible for securely 
conveying the patient readings between the patient, health 
professional and the health organization’s servers. The security 
protocol proposed here seeks to improve the security of health 
monitoring applications by providing secure admission control, 
authentication, confidentiality and integrity of the health data in 
combination with the ICMetric technology. The servers are 
responsible for controlling individual entities in the network. The 
servers enable entities that have never had contact before to 
interact securely and confidentially. The servers are operated by 
the healthcare provider and are responsible for assigning all the 
network specific configurations to successfully join a network. 
The following section details the steps involved in the secure 
functioning of the health monitoring cloud application based on 
the ICMetric technology: 
8.1 Secure Admission Control 
Key management and secure communication schemes are useful 
only if the IoT devices join the network through a secure 
admission process. The admission control scheme employed in 
the proposed secure transmission protocol is used only once when 
the device registers for the first time. The process is initiated when 
an IoT device requests to register by supplying necessary 
credentials. The device registration consists of the following 
unique activities. 
 When an entity wishes to register with the server, its necessary 
credentials are forwarded to the health organization’s server 
where the registration is digitized. 
 Once the entity is registered, the server is updated with a 
unique identification and a 128 bit random per-entity value 
(called "salt"). 
8.2 Symmetric Cryptographic Module 
This section provides the architectural details of the symmetric 
key cryptographic module in the protocol design. The symmetric 
cryptographic module provides security functionalities that 
facilitate secure transmission of data between the server and the 
IoT device. The symmetric cryptographic module automatically 
generates an ICMetric based session key between the sensor and 
the server, which is resilient to pre-computed attacks. The design 
of the proposed protocol is based on zero knowledge 
proof[18][19], which is coherent with the design principles of the 
ICMetric technology of not transmitting the device ICMetric. The 
proposed symmetric cryptographic module doesn’t require the 
exchange of ICMetric information between parties for the purpose 
of authentication and key generation, neither does it require 
human intervention to work; the keys are automatically generated 
based on the ICMetric of the IoT device. The generated ICMetric 
symmetric keys are then used for securely communicating the 
data between the patient and the health professional. The process 
of symmetric key generation and authentication is carried out 
between the IoT device and the server to establish symmetric 
session key for secure data communication between the patient 
and the health professional. 
To formally start the ICMetric based symmetric key generation 
process each registered sensor that wishes to communicate 
generates its own ICMetric. The entity 𝐼𝐷 is the identifying 
attribute for an entity assigned by the server at the time of 
registration. The 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑡 is generated by the server as a random 
number 128-bit number at the time of registration. The device 
generates its verifier 𝑣 at registration time and sends it to server as 
𝑥 = ℎ 𝑖𝑐𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐  𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑡  𝐼𝐷  
𝑣 = 𝑔𝑥𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑛  
where𝑔 is a generator of the multiplicative group and 𝑛 is a safe 
prime. 
The authentication process for the purpose of sending data 
readings to the server is initiated by the entity, when it sends an 
initiation request containing its 𝐼𝐷 to the server asking for the 
assigned salt value. On contacting the server, each sensor receives 
the salt stored on the server under its sensor 𝐼𝐷. Now the sensor 
computes𝑎 based on its 𝑖𝑐𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐, the assigned 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑡 and 𝐼𝐷. 
𝑎 = ℎ (𝑖𝑐𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐|| 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑡 || 𝐼𝐷) (6) 
and uses it to calculate verifier 𝐴 for sending it to the server. 
𝐴 =  𝑔𝑎  𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑛 (7) 
The server does a similar operation to calculate 𝑏 based on own 
salt, id and ICMetric value 
𝑏 = ℎ (𝑖𝑐𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑠|| 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑠  || 𝐼𝐷𝑠) (8) 
Then the server calculates 𝐵 and also adds the public verifier to it 
and sends 𝐵 to the sensor. 
𝐵 =  (𝑘𝐴 +  𝑔𝑏) 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑛 (9) 
Where 𝑘 = ℎ(𝑁||𝑔) 
Both sides compute a random scrambling parameter 𝑢 =
ℎ (𝐴 || 𝐵) based on the exchanged 𝐴 and 𝐵. So both sides can 
now construct the shared session key. The sensor constructs it as 
follows: 
𝐾𝐴 =  𝐵 –  𝑘 ∙ 𝑣 
𝑎+𝑢𝑥  𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑛 (10) 
The server constructs it as follows 
𝐾𝑆 =   𝐴 ∙ 𝑣
𝑢 𝑏  (11) 
Both sides now possess the same secure session key 𝐾 based on 
the respective formulae. 
To complete the authentication, now the sensor needs to prove to 
server that its key is identical. In order to do so, the sensor 
constructs the message 𝑀1 and sends it to the server, 
𝑀1 = ℎ ( 𝑁 || 𝑔 || 𝐼𝐷𝐴  ||𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑡𝐴  || 𝐴 || 𝐵 || 𝐾𝐴  ) (12) 
The server will calculate 𝑀2 using its own 𝐾𝑆 and compare it 
against the message received from the sensor. If both keys don’t 
match, the authentication fails resulting in refusal of 
communication request. If the sensor request is authenticated, the 
data can safely be relayed to the server. After an entity is 
authenticated and joins the network, its session key is kept in a 
secure cache and is valid for a set time period. The same process 
is carried out between the server and the doctor for the 
establishment of an ICMetric session key. 
8.3 Confidentiality and Integrity Module 
Once the session key is in place, secure communications can be 
carried out using any recognized symmetric key algorithms such 
as AES, 3DES. In the design, AES[20]is used to securely send 
health data between the entities and KGC. In this step, the 
designintegrates all the individual ICMetric based components 
with the symmetric encryption/ decryption scheme to achieve data 
confidentiality between the parties. This module performs 
encryption/ decryption and checks the integrity of the transmitted 
data based on AES-HMAC. 
9. CLOUD STORAGE, PROCESSING AND 
ANALYSIS 
All the data required for high-availability real-time monitoring of 
patients or required as input to data analysis algorithms, is 
transferred to the Cloud Gateway. The Cloud Gateway is a 
customised virtual machine that acts as an entry-point for the data 
into the cloud environment, as well as performing the job of 
middleware between the real-time monitoring and data analysis 
components of the framework. It also ensures that the data is 
stored and transmitted securely while it is being hosted in the 
cloud environment. To achieve the secure storage goal, it uses the 
data-at-rest encryption features, that have recently been offered by 
some cloud service providers [21], which allow the users of the 
cloud service to encrypt their data on cloud with their own 
encryption keys [22]. To achieve the secure transmission goal, it 
makes use of the Inter-Cloud Virtual Private Network (ICVPN) 
solution [23], which allows the users of the cloud service to 
establish dynamic and encrypted communication tunnels between 
their virtual machines running the cloud environment. 
In order to cater for the system goal of availability of the data, the 
Cloud Gateway again make use of the cloud’s scaling capability 
to dynamically increase both the number and processing 
capability of the virtual machines that constitute the Real-time 
Monitoring component of the framework [24][25]. This allows the 
framework to be able to keep up with the demands generated by 
the users at run-time and send the status and notification about the 
patients to the healthcare providers in a timely manner. 
For achieving the system goal of long-term data storage and 
analysis, the Cloud Gateway is able to communicate and interact 
with a number of Hadoop [26] based data analysis services from 
different cloud platforms [27]. The data relevant for this purpose 
is sent to the analysis services and algorithms and the subsequent 
reports and results are shared with the healthcare professionals.  
10. IMPLEMENTATION AND 
EVALUATION 
The working prototype of the proposed health sensing cloud 
framework has been implemented using C. The scheme has been 
implemented on a first generation Intel Corei3 3.2 Ghz processor 
with 6 GB RAM. The ICMetric secure transmission protocol has 
been implemented using the CyaSSL[28] and OpenSSL[29] 
cryptographic library. The design principles of the proposed 
secure cloud based health sensing framework for IoT devices has 
coherence with the ICMetric technology. The proposed 
framework has been evaluated by measuring the RAM 
consumption and running time for carrying out secure 
communications between the patient, health professional and the 
server based on 256 bit ICMetric keys. 
The evaluation of the running time of the ICMetric based health 
sensing framework is done using the programs runtime itself, 
whereas the memory consumed is evaluated using 
Valgrind[30][31]. The Valgrind results for memory evaluation; 
measure the memory consumed during the program’s lifetime and 
is represented in terms of useful heap, extra heap, total heap and 
stack. 
10.1 Running time Performance of ICMetric 
Secure Transmission Protocol 
This section evaluates the performance of the ICMetric Secure 
transmission protocol. Simulation results confirm that the 
ICMetric technology can be used to enhance the security of IoT 
systems with minimum impact on resource demand. It is evident 
from the table 2 that the running time for the generation of 
ICMetric based session key is 0.0035 seconds, which proves that 
the proposed scheme is able to provide session key generation at 
very minimal amounts of time consumption. 
Table 2. Running time for generation of ICMetric based 
session key 
Key size 256 bit 
Time taken 3576 microseconds 
The time performance of the confidentiality and integrity module 
that is responsible for carrying out the encryption / decryption of a 
data block using the ICMetric session key also needs to be 
assessed. Figure 3is a graph in which the 128 and 256 bit AES-
HMAC key variants are compared with the time taken. It is 
evident from the graph that an increase in the key size has a slight 
change on the time performance of the application. Therefore the 
proposed scheme is able to provide secure communications 
without substantial time performance overheads. 
 Figure 3. Running times for ICMetric based AES-HMAC. 
10.2 RAM Consumption of the ICMetric 
Secure Transmission Protocol 
Studying the scheme with reference to memory demand is also a 
necessary task. Once again, a 128 bit ICMetric is used as input for 
testing the prototype. The memory performance of the ICMetric 
secure transmission protocol is analyzed using Valgrind. The 
generated graphs depict memory profile of the protocol by 
presenting the program lifecycle and the memory (bytes) 
consumed. 
Figure 4 presents a memory profile graph for mutual 
authentication and session key generation of 256-bit ICMetric 
key. It is evident from the graph that the maximum total memory 
consumed for session key generation and authentication using 
256-bit key is around 9 KB, which is very suitable for resource 
constrained devices. This proves that the proposed scheme is able 
to provide high levels of security at the cost of very small amount 
of memory. 
 
Figure 4. RAM consumption for 256-bit ICMetric session Key. 
The figure 5 shows a memory profile graph for the 256-bit AES 
encryption/ decryption using ICMetric session key. It is evident 
from the graph that the maximum total memory consumed for 
encryption/ decryption using 256-bit key is 3.8 KB, which is again 
very suitable for resource constrained devices. This proves that 
the proposed scheme is able to provide high levels of security 
without much impact on memory demands. 
 
Figure 5. RAM consumption for ICMetric based 256-bit AES-
HMAC 
11. SECURITY ANALYSIS 
The cloud based secure ICMetric health monitoring framework 
combines the security advantages of ICMetric and security 
properties of the designed symmetric framework for the 
generation of a strong session key between the patient and the 
health specialist. No entity in the application relies on stored 
passwords. They rather generate their ICMetric value at runtime, 
this safeguards the device from device capture attacks. A major 
advantage of using ICMetric for our health monitoring application 
is that all the security is provided based on the ICMetric based 
keys, therefore at no point is there a need for human intervention. 
This is particularly important from the patient’s point of view 
since human intervention is not always possible for 
authentication, therefore the authentication functionality is carried 
out based on a device ICMetric. 
Each device concatenates its ICMetric with a random per-user 
value (salt) and stores the hash value of the result along with the 
salt. This makes certain kinds of brute-force attacks, rainbow table 
attacks and dictionary attacks more difficult. The security features 
of our design also prevent the possibility of man in the middle 
attack. If there is a man-in-the middle attack, the sending and 
receiving parties are not able to generate the same session keys 
resulting in a failed authentication rejection decision by the server. 
For the authentication of each entity’s device our scheme is based 
on the mixing of the salt value from the server with the ICMetric 
of each device, and hashing it to produce a value that can be used 
for authentication of each entity’s device. This feature ensures 
authenticity/ identification of participating entities and also 
assures the origin of information; since only entities that have 
been assigned a salt value from the server can communicate with 
other entities in the network. This feature helps ensure that all the 
sensors allocated to a patient are registered under his/her 
identification. The scheme ensures that the health professional 
who receives the triggered data is also registered. This enables 
only specific authenticated medical specialists to receive the data. 
To generate the symmetric key, the generating entity/ device must 
have the knowledge of the assigned salt value and must then 
generate its ICMetric. Knowing only one of them does not allow 
the generation of symmetric key. This safeguards the network 
from attackers, since only authenticated entities that have been 
registered/ assigned a salt by the server can form part of the 
symmetric key generation process. The symmetric session key is 
valid for the duration of session, this also prevents the application 
from brute force attacks, since the key is only valid for a session. 
Each of the sensors sends a trigger to the server which forms a 
single packet of all the three sensor readings to send to the health 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
128 256
T
im
e 
(m
ic
ro
se
co
n
d
s)
Key size (bits)
specialist. This provides obvious efficiency advantages since only 
a single block of encrypted health data is sent to the health 
specialist. The cloud based storage and analysis component of the 
framework ensures that the health data is always available to the 
health professional. This safeguards the health monitoring system 
from DoS attacks and also provides summarized results of the 
patients data to the health professionals for decision making. 
12. CONCLUSION 
Wearable healthcare devices have revolutionized the way in 
which healthcare is delivered. With the advent of wearable 
computing it has now become possible to deliver healthcare 
beyond the confines of the hospital. A vast benefit of such 
arrangements is a reduction in the health costs while patients 
enjoy improvement in healthcare and comfort. While there are 
many advantages of monitoring a person’s health remotely a 
major hurdle with this healthcare model is the provision of 
security. Attacks on healthcare systems are a global occurrence 
that has become a leading source of concern. Attackers attempt to 
attack healthcare systems with an intention of stealing data so that 
it can be used for a range of purposes like medical identity theft 
and prescription theft. A patient’s health can be monitored by 
using both invasive and noninvasive sensors/ devices. Devices 
like pacemakers can be implanted into a patient’s body while 
other variants can also function externally. Similarly there are 
sensors that monitor a person’s vital signs like breathing, heart 
rate and body temperature at regular intervals. Since these sensors 
monitor a person’s physiological responses therefore it is 
imperative to secure the device, data, patient and health 
professional in a resource efficient but comprehensive manner. 
A cloud based ICMetric patient monitoring system is presented in 
this paper. The proposed scheme effectively combines the 
functionalities of ICMetric based secure transmission protocol for 
providing mutual authentication, integrity and confidentiality of 
data in a resource efficient manner. The proposed security 
architecture is able to prevent most threats related to secure 
communication of health data, while considering the constraints 
that embedded systems demand. The design decisions of proposed 
framework makes it particularly suitable for resource constrained 
environments, which require elimination of computationally 
expensive and resource intensive operations while providing the 
required security. The cloud based secure health monitoring 
framework addresses the need for secure remote monitoring of 
patients by providing secure access control, authentication and 
confidentiality of the transmitted triggers to the health 
professional. The security analysis and implementation results of 
the scheme make it evident that the proposed framework is very 
suitable for health monitoring applications in terms of security 
and resource consumption. 
We have also shown how the proposed framework can be 
extended to utilize the benefits of cloud computing while still not 
compromising on the security of the data. Cloud’s scalability and 
distributed data processing capabilities have been harnessed in the 
framework’s design to cater for the availability and data analysis 
objectives, while existing cloud security features have been 
integrated with the framework’s core ICMetric based security 
components in order to share the benefits of both domains. 
The future plan of this work is to evaluate the proposed scheme 
through experiments and analysis on real cloud environments, 
thus benchmarking the results against existing schemes that 
provide security in resource constrained environments. 
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